Abstract. An A 3 -code is an extension of A-code in which none of the three participants, transmitter, receiver and arbiter, is assumed trusted. In this paper we extend the previous model of A 3 -codes by allowing transmitter and receiver not only to individually attack the system but also collude with the arbiter against the other. We derive informationtheoretic lower bounds on success probability of various attacks, and combinatorial lower bounds on the size of key spaces. We also study combinatorial structure of optimal A 3 -code against collusion attacks and give a construction of an optimal code.
Introduction
Authentication codes (A-codes) [7] provide protection for two trustworthy participants against an active spoofer tampering with the messages sent by a transmitter to a receiver over a public channel. In this model transmitter and receiver are assumed trusted. An extension of this model is an authentication codes with arbitration [8] , or A 2 -codes for short, in which transmitter and receiver are not trusted: transmitter may deny a message that he/she has sent, and receiver may attribute a fraudulent message to the transmitter. In an A 2 -code a trusted third party, called arbiter, resolves the dispute between transmitter and receiver. A 2 -codes have been studied by various authors [3] , [4] and [6] . Brickell and Stinson ([1] ) introduced authentication code with dishonest arbiter(s), or A 3 -code, in which the arbiter may tamper with the communication but it will remain trusted in her arbitration. In an A 3 -code each participant in the system has some secret key information which is used to protect him/her against attacks in the system. These codes have been also studied in [2] , [3] and [9] , where some constructions were given. However none of these constructions protect against collusion attacks.
Collusion attacks in A-codes are studied in various extensions of A-codes, such as multisender schemes [10] where unauthorised groups of senders can collude to construct a fraudulent message that is attributed to an authorised group, and multreceiver schemes where unauthorised groups of receivers collude to construct a fraudulent message that is attributed to the transmitter. The model studied in [3] is an extension of multreceiver schemes where transmitter can collude with unauthorised groups of receivers. In the former two cases no arbitration is required as at least one side in the communication is trusted, that is receiver in a multisender scheme and transmitter in a multireceiver scheme are assumed trusted. However in the last case none of the sides is trusted and there can be a dispute between a receiver and a colluding group of the sender and receivers. The suggestion for resolving the dispute is to either include a trusted arbiter or, take the majority vote of the receivers. In this paper we extend the attack model of A 3 -codes to include collusion between arbiter and transmitter or receiver, against the other participants. For example, the arbiter may collude with the transmitter to construct a message that the transmitter can later deny sending it, or she may collude with the receiver to impersonate the sender or substitute a message that he has sent. We assume that the arbiter always honestly follows the arbitration rules. These rules are public and collusion with a participant effectively means that the arbiter will make her key information available to that participant.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model and derive information theoretic bounds on success probabilities of various attacks, and combinatorial bounds on the size of key spaces for each participant. Section 3 gives combinatorial structure of Cartesian optimal A 3 -codes. Section 4 gives a construction for such codes.
Model and Bounds
There are three participants: a transmitter, T , a receiver, R and an arbiter, A, none of them is assumed trusted. T wants to send a source state s, s ∈ S, to R over a public channel. Each participant has some secret key. T uses his key information to construct a message m ∈ M for a source state s to be sent over the channel. R uses her key information to verify authenticity of a received message and finally A who does not know the key information of T and R will use her key information to resolve a dispute between the two. Transmitter's key, e t , determines the encoding function e t : S → M used by the transmitter, and receiver's key, e r , determines the verification function e r : M → S ∪ {F } and so the subset of M that R will accept as valid message. Arbiter's key, e a , determines a subset M (e a ) ⊂ M , which the arbiter accepts as valid.
There is also an outsider, O, who has no key information. A colluding group of attackers in general use their knowledge of the system, their key information and all the previous communicated messages to construct fraudulent messages.
The system has the following stages. Key Distribution: during which a triple (e t , e r , e a ) of keys for the three participants T, R, and A is generated and each participant's key is securely delivered to him/her. This stage can be either performed by a trusted party, or by a collaboration of the three principals. A valid triple has the property that if e t (s) = m then e r (m) = s and e a (m) = s.
Authentication: T uses e t to generate an authentic message. Verification: R uses e r to verify authenticity of a received message m. She will also always ask for the verdict of A on the message. R will only accept a message if both R and A accept the message as authentic. We note that in [3] a message is acceptable by the receiver if e r (m) ∈ S. This means that e r (m) ∈ S implies e a (m) ∈ S. We assume M (e r ) ∩ M (e a ) = ∅ and so for every message both conditions, e r (m) ∈ S and e a (m) ∈ S, must be checked.
Arbitration: A dispute occurs in a number of situations. In the following we list possible disputes and the rules for resolving the disputes. We note that the rules are public and A's arbitration can be later verified by everyone.
Arbitration Rule I (AR I):
T denies sending a message m.
-T wins if m is acceptable by e r and e a .
-T looses otherwise. 2. Arbitration Rule II (AR II): R attributes a message m to T but T denies it.
-R wins if m is valid under e a .
-R looses otherwise.
The system is subject to the following attacks. 4. Attack T 0 : Using his key (an encoding rule) e t , transmitter sends a fraudulent message m which is not valid under e t . He succeeds if both the receiver and the arbiter accept the message. 5. Collusion Attack RA i : Having received a sequence of i legitimate messages m 1 , m 2 , · · · , m i , R and A collude to construct a message which R claims it is sent by the transmitter. They succeed if m can be generated by the transmitter under e t .
Collusion Attack T A:
A and T , using their keys e t and e a , collude to construct a message m which is not valid under e t but using AR I makes T a winner.
Let E T , E R and E A be the set of transmitter's, receiver's and arbiter's keys, respectively, and assume p(x, y, z) is the joint probability distribution on E T × E R × E A . Also assume there is a probability distribution on the set of source states S. Denote the support of the joint probability distribution by We will also use the following notations.
Let M be the set of all possible messages, and M i denote the set of sequences of i distinct messages.
Using these notations, success probabilities in various attacks are given as follows.
We note that P Oi and P T0 are different from similar attacks given in [3] as we define success of an attacker as successful verification by the receiver and successful acceptance by the arbiter while in [3] only the first condition is required.
Information Theoretic Bounds
We will use following notations throughout the paper.
Theorem 1 gives the information-theoretic lower bounds on the above 6 types of attack.
Theorem 1. In an A
3 -code against collusion attacks we have
P T A ≥ 2 H(ER|M,ET ,EA)−H(ER|ET ,EA)
.
Combinatorial Bounds on Key Spaces
To derive combinatorial bounds we will assume that the probability distribution on E T •E R •E A is uniform. With this assumption we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2. In an A 3 -code if all six kinds of attacks meet their lower bounds, then
An A 3 -code is called l-optimal if, (i) all six types of attacks meet their lower bounds in theorem 1, and (ii) all inequalities in theorem 2 are satisfied with equalities.
In the following we give structural properties of l-optimal codes in order to analyse their combinatorial structure.
Corollary 1. In an optimal A
3 -code against collusion attacks the following properties are satisfied. 
If
An A 3 -code is called a Cartesian A 3 -code if for any message m, there is a unique source state s which can be encoded to m.
This means that in a Cartesian code M can be partitioned into M (s 1 ), M (s 2 ), · · · such that messages in M (s j ) only correspond to s j .
More precisely, for an s ∈ S and (e r , e a ) ∈ E R • E A , define M (s) = {m : s can be encoded to m by some e t ∈ E T }.
Then using Corollary 1, we have
|M (s)| = |ET | |ET (m)| is a constant. So |M | |S| = |M (s)| for all s ∈ S.(7)
Connection with Combinatorial Designs
In this section we study the combinatorial structure of Cartesian l-optimal A 3 -code against collusion attacks. In particular we give a combinatorial structure of E T , E R , E A and E R • E A .
First we recall some definitions. (V, B) , where V is a set of v points and B is a family of k-subsets (called blocks) of V.
Definition 1. A block design is a pair

Definition 2. A block design (V, B) is called α-resolvable if the block set B is
partitioned into classes C 1 , C 2 , · · · , C n with the property that in each class, every point occurs in exactly α blocks.
We will be interested in α-resolvable designs with the following property:
There is an integer l, 0 < l < n, such that property (P1) below is satisfied.
(P1) Any collection of i blocks, from i different classes either intersect in
For each participant we define an incidence structure which defines the mapping given by the participant's keys. For receiver and arbiter, the incidence structure is given by a 0, 1 matrix, whose rows are labelled by the participant's keys and columns are labelled by M , and the element in row e and column m is 1 if e(m) ∈ S and 0, otherwise. For transmitter, it is given by a matrix whose rows are labelled by transmitter's key, and its columns are labelled by S and the element in row e and column s is m if e t (s) = m.
In the following subsections we will study the relationships between combinatorial designs and each participant's incidence structure.
E
R Theorem 3. In an l-optimal A 3 -code against collusion attacks, design (E R , {E R (m) : m ∈ M }) is α
(R)-resolvable with property (P1). It has the parameters:
α(R) = |M| |S| P A0 , µ i (R) = |E R |(P O0 P O1 · · · P Oi−1 )(P R0 P R1 · · · P Ri−1 ) −1 , 1 ≤ i ≤ l + 1.
E A
By 7 of Corollary 1 |E
A (m)| is a constant. So (E A , {E A (m) : m ∈ M }) forms a block design.
Theorem 4. In an l-optimal A 3 -code against collusion attacks, design (E A , {E A (m) : m ∈ M }) is α(A)-resolvable with property (P1). It has the parameters:
α(A) = |M| |S| P R0 , µ i (A) = |E A |(P O0 P O1 · · · P Oi−1 )(P A0 P A1 · · · P Ai−1 ) −1 , 1 ≤ i ≤ l + 1.
E R • E A
Note that in an optimal code E R • E A corresponds to an α-resolvable design as well. It has the following properties: 
Theorem 5. In an l-optimal A
3 -code against collusion attacks, design
-resolvable with properties (P1), (P2) and (P3).
It has the parameters:
E T
In order to describe E T , we recall some definitions to be used later.
Definition 3. A t-design is a block design (V, B) so that any t-subset of V occurs in exactly λ blocks.
Definition 4. A partially balanced t-design is a block design (V, B), where every t-subset of V either occurs in exactly λ blocks or does not occur in any block.
We denote this design by t − (v, k; {λ, 0})-design, where v is the total number of points and k is the size of a block.
is a strong partially balanced tdesign if it is a i − (v, k; {λ i , 0})-design, for any i, 1 < i < t, and also a 1-design. 
Now consider design (M, E T ).
Theorem 6. In an l-optimal A
3 -code against collusion attacks, design (M, E T ) is a (l + 1) − (|M |, |S|; {λ, 0})-design which is strong and resolvable, it has parameters as follows:
It is known that in an optimal A-code, the transmitter and the receiver have a partially balanced t-design (see [5] ), or an orthogonal array if the code is Cartesian (see [1] ). In an optimal Cartesian A 2 -code the transmitter has a partially balanced t-design, while the receiver has an α-resolvable design (see [6] ). Our results in this section show that in an optimal Cartesian A 3 -code against collusion attacks, the transmitter has a partially balanced t-design, while the receiver and the arbiter have α-resolvable designs each.
Optimal Code from Finite Geometry
In this section we show an example of 1-optimal A 3 -code against collusion attacks.
Let GF (q) be a field of q elements, P G(n, q) be a n-dimensional projective space over GF (q). Every point on P G(n, q) has a homogeneous coordinate (x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x n ), here not all x i are zero. Two homogeneous coordinates (x 0 , x 1 , · · · , x n ) and (x 0 , x 1 , · · · , x n ) identify the same point if and only if there is a nonzero constant c such that where the rank of coefficient matrix (a ij ) is n − k. Thus a 0-flat is a point, a 1-flat is a line, a 2-flat is a plane, and so on. Now consider P G(4, q) to construct our code. Let each message correspond to a 3-flat in P G (4, q) . Fix a line L S in P G (4, q) . Let the points on L S be regarded as source states. Let the transmitter's encoding rule be a 2-flat e t not intersecting L S . Let the receiver's decoding rule and the arbiter's arbitration rule be points e r and e a , respectively. The pair (e t , e r , e a ) is valid if and only if e r , e a are on e t . A source state s will be encoded to m =< s, e t > which is a 3-flat passing through s and e t . The receiver accepts a message m if and only if e r is in m, the arbiter arbitrates that m should be accepted by the receiver if and only if e a is in m. This code is optimal with the parameters:
Conclusion
In this paper we introduced a new model for A 3 -codes, obtained information theoretic and combinatorial bounds on security and efficiency parameters of the codes, defined optimal codes and finally derived combinatorial structure of optimal Cartesian codes. Our study of the optimal A 3 -codes is limited to Cartesian codes. Combinatorial structure of optimal A 3 -codes in the general case is an open problem.
